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This paper identifies the extent to which exchange rate
movements directly explain improvements in competitive-
nessand rising trade surpluses in Taiwanand Koreainthe
1980s. The hypothesis that exchange rate movements im-
proved competitiveness and thus contributed directly to
trade imbalances in the1980sholdsfor Korea, but notfor
Taiwan. On the basis ofthe paper's results, the options
available to both economies in attempting to correct their
external imbalances are briefly examined.
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The large trade surpluses of the newly-industrializing
economies (NIBs) of East Asia have been the subject of
much discussion in recent years. Following their meetings
atthe Louvre inParis inFebruary 1987, the FinanceMinis-
ters of the G-6 major industrial countries issued a commu-
nique noting that the Asian NIBsl were contributing
importantly to the present pattern of global imbalances.
They called on the NIBs to assume greater responsibility
for preserving an open world trade system by reducing
trade barriers and pursuing policies that allow their cur-
rencies to reflect more fully underlying economic funda-
mentals.
Among the NIBs, TaiwanandKorea, in particular, have
accumulated large trade surpluses in recent years,2 leading
to allegations of unfair trading practices. For example, in
October 1988, the U.S. Treasury reported to the Congress
that Taiwan and Korea haveused trade restrictions to gain
competitive advantage, and that it considers Taiwan and
Korea to have "manipulate(d) the rate of exchange be-
tween their currency and the U.S. dollar for purposes
of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments
or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international
trade."3 As a result, the United States is negotiating with
both Taiwan and Korea on their exchange rate policies.
These negotiations apparently assume that Taiwan and
Koreawouldhavebeen far less competitive, and their trade
surpluses would have been much smaller, if currency
manipulation had not prevented the appreciation of their
currencies. This assumption cannot beeasily tested, asitis
impossible to determine whattheexchange rates ofTaiwan
and Korea would have been in the absence of government
intervention in exchange markets. However, it is possible
to determine the direct contribution of exchange rate
movements to the competitiveness, and hence trade sur-
pluses, of Taiwan and Korea. A finding that exchangerate
movements account for significant competitive gains and
have therefore been a major source of trade imbalances
would support the concern with the exchange rate policies
of these two economies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews
trends in trade flows, and discusses how trade and ex-
change rate policies may haveinfluenced competitiveness.
Section II describes a standard partial equilibrium model
Economic Review / Spring 1989of export and import prices and volumes to determine the
relationships between exchange rates, competitiveness,
and real trade flows in these two economies. Section III
discusses the results ofestimatingthis model andidentifies
the contribution of exchange rates, relative prices, and
relative income growth to the trade surpluses of Taiwan
and Korea between 1974 and 1987. Rough calculations
also illustrate the extent of exchange rate appreciation that
would be required to eliminate recent trade surpluses and
subsequently maintain trade balance. Section IV presents
conclusions.
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Chart la shows the trend in nominal exports, imports,
and the trade balance of Taiwan. Chart lb shows these
same trends, but in real, or price-level adjusted, terms. The
corresponding nominal and real trade flows for Korea are
illustrated in Charts 2a and 2b. Taiwan's and Korea'strade
surpluses have grown to unprecedented magnitudes, par-
ticularly in nominal terms. The 1987nominal trade surplus
was $21 billion for Taiwan and $8 billion for Korea and,
respectively, 19.5 percent and 7.1 percent of GNP, com-
pared to 3.5 percent for Japan.
The charts reveal some differences between the nominal
and real measures of trade flows, particularly in the short-
run. Taiwan's real trade surplus appears to havestabilized
in late 1985, whereas in nominal U.S. dollars, itcontinued
to rise until the second half of 1987(both measures show a
sharp drop in Taiwan's trade surplus in the second half of
1987).Itis also apparent that the increase in Korea's trade
surplus since 1985is much larger in nominal terms than it
is in constant 1985 U.S. dollars.
However, the overall trends in real and nominal trade
balances are about the same for both Taiwan and Korea.
One striking feature is the rapid growth of exports in both
economies, at a pace exceeding export growth in most of
the rest of the world. Real exports grew at a compound
annual growth rate of 14to 15percent in Taiwanand Korea
between 1974 and 1987.Itis also remarkable that until the
1980s, rapid growth in imports matched or evenexceeded
the growth in exports over long periods." In Taiwan, trade
surpluses ballooned only after 1981, when import growth
tapered off, while exports continued to grow at roughly
their previous trend. In contrast, Korea had trade deficits
until 1985. Trade surpluses grew after 1985because export
growth outpaced very rapid import growth. Imports have
not levelled off in Korea.5
A majorshift in thecompositionoftraded goodscontrib-
uted to the strong export performance of Taiwan and
Korea. In Taiwan, the share of manufacturing exports
increased from 41 percent in 1965 to 91 percent in 1986,
while in Korea, it increased from 51percent to 90 percent
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other primary commodities and foods in total imports fell.
Trade was also characterized by a triangular trade pattern,
with NIBs importingcapital goodsmainly from Japan, and
exporting light manufactures to the U.S.9
Although this triangular trade pattern has weakened in
recent years, it may have contributed to the large bilateral
surpluses of Taiwan and Korea with the U.S. In 1987,
$17.2 billion of Taiwan's $21billion nominal trade surplus
was with the U.S. Korea's trade surplus with the U.S. was
$8.9billion, exceeding its overall trade surplus of about $8
billion. (At the same time, both Taiwan and Korea had
bilateral deficits in the neighborhood of $5 billion with
Japan.)These sizable bilateral surpluses are thereason that
U.S. authorities, in particular, have been concerned about
both the trade and exchange rate policies of Taiwan and
Korea.
over the same period." Light manufactures are dominant,
butthe share of capital-intensive manufactures has risen in
recent years, particularly in Korea." In both economies
export growth has been most rapid in those sectors where
world demand has been growing most rapidly.
Rapid growth in imports of capital goods destined for
the export-producing sector" has accompanied the growth
ofmanufacturedexportsin the twoNIBs. Partly asaresult,
manufactured imports' share in total imports rose from 58
to 65 percent between 1965 and 1986 in Taiwan and from
51 to 64 percent in Korea. In both economies, the share of
fuels in total imports at least doubled, while the shares of
Chart 28
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Trade Policies
Critics have accused Taiwan and Korea of maintaining
restrictive trade policies (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, sub-
sidies, and tax incentives) that have contributed to their
trade surpluses in the 1980s. If this belief is correct, the
trade liberalization implemented in recent years in Taiwan
and Korea will significantly reduce existing trade sur-
pluses. Ifit is incorrect, those who expect trade liberaliza-
tion to correct the external imbalancesofTaiwanand Korea
will be disappointed, although the further liberalization of
trade in both economies is probably desirable on its own
merits. Unfortunately, the contributionof trade restrictions
to the trade surpluses of the two NIBs in the 1980s is
unclear.10
On the one hand, most of the growth of trade surpluses
in each economy appears to have occurred during periods
when trade barriers were falling, or at the very least
not rising." In the case of Taiwan, average tariff rates
remainedaround 31percentfrom 1980 to 1984(down from
44 percent in 1978) and fell to around 20 percent in 1987.
Non-tariff barriers do not appear to have increased in the
first half of the 1980s, either. As a result of a trade
liberalization program initiated in 1986, the share of per-
missible imports has been rising. In 1988, the OECD
reported that permissible imports (for which import li-
censes are automatically approved) accountedforabout 70
percent of total imports, while controlled imports ac-
counted for 20 percent (10 percent are not subject to
licensing). 12
In the case of Korea, average tariff rates fell from 33
percent in 1984 to about 20 percent in 1987 (a period of
rising trade surpluses), while the share of importable
commodities enjoying automatic licensing approval rose
32 EconomicReview / Spring 1989from 85percentin 1984to 94 percent in 1987(compared to
about 50 percent in 1977).
On the other hand, selective trade barriers, which pre-
vented imports of certain goods (notably luxuriesj.P may
haveslowedthe growth of total imports, and thus contrib-
uted to rising trade surpluses. Specifically, barriers to
imports of consumer goods may have prevented a shift in
the composition of imports that would haveoffset a tend-
ency towardtrade surpluses in both economies. Over time,
productivity increases in rapidly developing economies
such as Taiwanand Korea will lowertheimports of capital
and intermediate goods that are required for any unit of
exports, leading to a tendency toward rising trade sur-
pluses. At the same time, however, rising incomes asso-
ciated with productivity gains should lead to increased
imports of highly income-elastic consumer goods. This in
turn, should offset the lagging growth in imports ofcapital
and intermediate goods.14
In this situation, selective trade barriers may havepre-
vented the rise in the imports of consumer goods, and
contributed to rising trade surpluses in the twoeconomies
because these barriers, in effect, lowered the overall in-
come elasticity of imports. For example, in Taiwan, a
sharp drop in investment in the early 1980s reduced im-
ports of raw materials and capital goods, the largest
components of total imports, while trade barriers probably
prevented an offsetting rise in the imports of consumer
goods.P This may have contributed to the stagnation in
imports in Taiwan in the first half of the 1980s(Charts la
and 2a).
Exchange Rate Policies
In addition to concerns about trade barriers, the trading
partners of Taiwan and Koreahaveaccused these countries
of manipulating their currencies to gain competitive ad-
vantage,which, in turn, has contributed to verylarge trade
surpluses. While currency manipulation and its effective-
ness are often difficult to establish, some insights into a
government's exchange rate objectives can be obtained by
examining policy statements, capital controls, and indica-
tors of intervention in exchange markets.
Up to the late 1970s, the New Taiwan (NT) dollar, like
the Korean won, were officially pegged to the U.S. dollar.
Taiwan has not declared its exchange rate targets since it
shifted from fixed exchange rates to a managed float in
February 1979, although it uses an undisclosed basket of
currencies as a guide for exchange rate management.
Nevertheless, the shift in capital controls awayfrom pre-
venting capital outflows toward discouraging capital in-
flows, and indirect indicators of intervention in exchange
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
markets suggest adesire tolimitthe appreciation oftheNT
dollar.
Traditionally, capital controls in Taiwan focused on
preventing outflows·of foreign currency, for example, by
requiring that all foreign exchange be sold to the central
bank for local currency. (Authorized foreign currency
deposits in local banks were exempt.) Such controls on
capital outflows became irrelevant in the 1980sbecause of
a strong surge in gross capital inflows, which many
observers believe was associated with speculation that the
NTdQllar was undervalued. As a result of these develop-
ments, controls on trade-related transactions were com-
pletelylifted after July 1987,and capital export limits were
eased sut:>stantially. (Capital exports of $1 million or less
per transaction, with an annual limit of $5 million, require
no government authority.)
Atthe same time, significant restrictions wereplaced on
capital inflows. Financial inflows were limited to $50,000
peryearper account and after October1987,restrictions on
dollar borrowing by Taiwanbanks (to prevent speculation)
and a $3 million limit on dollar short positions were
imposed. Inward direct foreign investment is still subject
to approval. While earlier measures to limit capital out-
flows eased downward pressure on the value of the NT
dollar,the more recent restrictions on capital inflows tend
to dampen the appreciation of the NT dollar by limiting
conversions of foreign assets into domestic currency.
In addition to changes in the focus of capital controls,
there is indirect evidence of massive intervention to limit
currency appreciation. The purchase of foreign currency
by Taiwan's central bank tends to increase central bank
foreign exchange reserves, and if it is unsterilized, tends to
increase the domestic money supply, as well. Taiwan's
foreign exchange reserves more than doubled in 1986and
roseafurther 66 percent in 1987to US $76.7 billion, over
50 times its level ten years earlier. At the same time, Ml
moneygrowth rose from 12.2% in 1985to 51%in 1986and
38% in1987. Emery (1988)found that much of the growth
inthe moneysupply inrecent yearswastheresultofforeign
assets acquired by the central bank.
Korea abandoned its peg to the U.S. dollar in January
1980and subsequently has targeted a basket ofcurrencies,
which is.adjusted to reflect changes in Korea's external
position. While thecomposition ofthe basket ofcurrencies
has. not been disclosed, Korean authorities have been
somewhat more explicit than Taiwanabout their exchange
rate objectives in this decade. In 1980, the Korean govern-
ment devalued the currency to dampen growth in external
deficits.l" After 1985, Korean authorities apparently ad-
justed their exchange rate target to maintain an annual
33trade surplus of about $5 billion in order "to reduce
Korea's large outstanding external debt to a more manage-
able level."17In fact, Korea's surpluses haveexceeded this
amount, permitting a reduction of Korea's external debt
through prepayments from US $46.7 billion at the end of
1985 to US $35.6 billion at the end of 1987.18 Korea's
present goal is to become a net creditor by 1991,but recent
reports indicate that this target will be met in 1989, two
years ahead of schedule.
Efforts at exchange rate management appear tohavehad
a smallerimpact ondomestic monetary control inKorea,as
there has been no sudden explosion in foreign exchange
reserves nor such a rapid acceleration in the rate of growth
of the money supply as in Taiwan. Foreign exchange
reserves in Korea rose from US $2.8 billion in 1985to US
$3.6billion in 1987, whileMl growth averagedalittle over
15 percent in 1986 and 1987, compared to 11 percent in
1985. Unlike Taiwan, until 1987, there was less evidence
of strong incipient capital inflows that might have pro-
duced a stronger won than was actually observed perhaps
because of the large repayments of external debt.
Exchange Rates and Competitiveness
The outcome of government efforts to influence the
currency in Taiwan and Korea and the impact of exchange
rate movements on competitiveness is partly indicated by
the behavior of nominal and real (adjusted for relative
inflation rates) exchange rates. Nominal exchange rate
movements are a useful indicator of government intentions
in exchange markets because they can be controlled di-
rectly by policy makers; in particular, countries wishing to
achieve competitive gains typically devalue the nominal
value of their currencies. However, nominal rates are not
the only factor affecting competitiveness. Many countries
with depreciating exchange rates experience no competi-
tive gains because of high domestic inflation. 19 An often-
used measure of how movements in nominal exchange
rates may affect competitiveness is the real exchange rate.
While more precise measures are developed in the next
section, movements in the real exchange rate serve to
illustrate basic trends in competitiveness.
Charts 3aand 3b illustrate thepath ofthe U.S. dollar and
trade-weightednominal and real exchange rates forTaiwan
and Korea, respectively, from 1974 to 1987.20 Chart 3a
indicates that the nominal NT dollar fell against the U.S.
dollar as the latter appreciated against most major curren-
cies in the early 1980s. The NT dollar then appreciated
strongly against the U.S. dollar after 1985, as the latter
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weakened. As a result, the nominal trade-weighted NT
dollar fluctuated around its value in 1980from the second
half of 1979to the first half of 1983. Although there was a
sharp dipin the nominal trade-weighted index in 1985,
fluctuations since 1984haveonthe whole followeda strong
upward trend. In particular, the sharp appreciation that
occurred after 1985raised the trade-weighted value of the
nominal Taiwan dollar rose to its highest levels over the
period in the chart.
Chart 3a also shows that even as the nominal NT dollar
reached its highest values over the sample period, the real
trade-weighted exchange rate was on a downward trend
from 1980 to 1986, and remained below its 1980 peak in
1987. Thus, relatively low domestic inflation, rather than
nominal exchange rate movements, appears to explain
gains incompetitiveness inTaiwan. Nonetheless, critics of
Taiwan's exchange rate policy argue that the nominal NT
dollar wouldhaveappreciated much more intheabsence of
government manipulation of the currency, perhaps rising
by enough to offset the gains in competitiveness caused by
Taiwan's low inflation.
Turning now to Korea, Chart 3b reveals that since 1974
there has been a downward trend in the nominal value of
the won on a dollar- and a trade-weighted basis. In line
with the policy intentions discussed previously, the nomi-
nal trade-weighted wondeclined sharply in 1980and since
1985, notwithstanding an 18percent appreciation against
the U.S. dollar between 1985and 1987.
Despite the strong nominal depreciation of the won, the
real value of the won suggests that at least until 1985, there
were no gains in competitiveness, since inflation in Korea
far exceeded inflation among its trading partners. After
1985,however,the decline in thewon appears tohavebeen
reflected in real gains in competitiveness.
Notwithstanding the evidence of government action to
influence the value of the NT dollar and the won, it is not
easy to determine the extent to which currency manipula-
tion may have affected the values of the currencies of the
two NIEs. The reason is that wecannot measure the extent
towhichTaiwan orKorea'scurrencies wouldhaveappreci-
ated in the absence of government intervention and capital
controls.
However, it is possible to measure more precisely the
extent to which exchange rate changes directly contributed
to changes in competitiveness, as well as the relative
contribution of changes in competitiveness to the trade
surpluses of Taiwan and Korea. These questions are ad-
dressed in the remainder of the paper.
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'Irade Prices
InSectionI, therealexchange ratewas usedtoanalyze
how nominal exchange rate movements are reflected in
changes in competitiveness. Whiletherealexchange rate
is a usefulproxyforchanges in competitiveness for most
purposes, it has certaindisadvantages. Forexample, the
II. Modelling 'Irade Prices and 'Irade Flows
Inthissection,astandards! model ofexportandimport moreimportant. Alsofromthemodel,wecanderiverough
pricesandtradeflows isdeveloped toassessthe contribu- estimates of theextentof exchange rateappreciation that
tion of exchange rates to competitiveness and the trade would berequired toeliminatethetradesurpluses thatnow
surplusesofTaiwan andKorea. Inthe model,theinfluence exist,assuming thatnootherchangesinpolicyaremade.
ofexchange ratesoncompetitiveness isanalyzedbydevel-
opingequationsthatrelateexchange rates(andother price
variables)toexport and import prices. Then, equations
thatrelatechangesinpricesandincometotradeflows are
developed.
This model enables us to assess whether changes in
exchange rates andin competitiveness are themajorex-
planation fortrade surpluses, orwhether otherfactors are
Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco 35b.. If there is a full pass through of exchange rates to
import prices, the coefficient b, = -1; if the pass through
isnotcomplete,0>b,> - 1.
'frade Flows
The real demand for exports (X") is a function of
the relative price of exports (PEX) and foreign income
(FGpP). Therelative price of exports is defined asPEX
(PX)(XR)/FCPI, where PX is the export price, XR is units
offorei~n currency over domestic currency, and FCPI is
theforeign consumer price index. These relationships may
be represented by the following equation:
(3)
(4)
Wheredl < 0andd2 > O. Therelative priceofimports isthe
ratio of import prices to the domestic price level, that is,
PIM = PM/CPI.
Theprice and income elasticities of exports and imports
reflect preferences, the composition of exports and im-
ports, and the impact of trade barriers. For example, the
demand for primary commodities is generally less price
elastic than the demand for manufactured goods.>' As a
result,tbeprice elasticity of exports will tend tobe smaller
than the price elasticity of imports in countries that export
primary commodities and import manufactured goods.
'Tradebarriers also may affect the observed elasticities.
Forexample, if a country's imports are limited by quotas,
while those of its trading partners are not, the price
elasticities of imports will tend to be low compared with
the price elasticities of exports. The income elasticity of
imports also may be lower than the income elasticity of
exports if quotas affect a sufficiently broad range of
imports, or if, as suggested earlier, quotas or other quan-
Ifrelative export prices rise, the demand for exports will
fall, soci < O. Ontheotherhand, ifforeignincomerises, the
demand for exports will rise, so c2 > O. As suggested
previously, two offsetting factors determine the impactof a
currency appreciation on the relative export price ex-
pressed in foreign currency (PEX). From the definition of
PEX, a currency appreciation raises PEX by raising XR.
However, exporters may offset this effect by lowering the
export price in domestic currency (PX) (see discussion of
equation 1).
Similarly, the real demand for imports (M'') depends on
the relative price of imports (PIM) and domestic income
(GDP):
real exchange rate measure implies that a 10% currency
appreciation immediately results in a 10%lossin competi-
tiveness. However, this is not always the case. Exporters
may not raise their export prices by 10%, but instead
choose to absorb some of the impact of exchange rate
changesby reducing their profitmargins. Thus, amodel of
how exporters and importers set their prices, such as the
one developed below, provides a better indicator of how
exchange rate changes are reflected in changes in competi-
tiveness.
It is assumed that in setting the prices of traded goods,
suppliers add a markup over their costs of production,
represented by domestic prices in the case of exports, and
by foreign prices in the case of imports. The markup is in
turn a function of competing goods prices, which are
influenced by exchange rates, domestic prices (in the case
of imports) and foreign prices (in the case of exports).22
The price of exports (PX) in domestic currency is thus
expressed as a reduced-form function of the exchange rate
(XR, defined as units of foreign currency over domestic
currency), domestic prices (CPI), and foreign prices
(FCPl).
where all variables are expressed in logarithms (so that the
coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities), al < 0, and
a2,a3>0.
Thecoefficient al warrants somediscussion. Acurrency
appreciation increases the export price expressed in for-
eign currency, thereby reducing the competitiveness of
domestic producers in world markets. Ifal = 0, exporters
fully "pass through" this export price change. If al < 0,
exporters are attempting to offset the loss in competitive-
ness by lowering the export price in domestic currency.
Thus, the pass through from exchange rates to export
prices is measured by I+al . In a perfectly competitive
environment, a pass through coefficient of unity (a, = 0)
might be expected. A pass through coefficient of less than
one is typically interpreted to reflect imperfectly competi-
tive markets.P as discussed below.
Import prices (PM) in domestic currency may be ex-
pressed as a reduced form function of the exchange rate,
foreign prices, and domestic prices, where foreign prices
reflect the costs of production and the other variables
influence the extent of the mark-up over foreign prices.
Itisexpectedthatb, < 0 andb2, b, > O. Inthiscase,thepass
through of exchange rates to import prices is measured by
36 EconomicReview / Spring 1989titative restrictions prevent an increase in the imports of
consumer goods.
On the other hand, if tariff barriers are significant, the
relatively higher price of imports compared to domestic
goods.will lower the share of imports in total income.
Under certainconditions, tariffbarriers also maylowerthe
income elasticity of imports in comparison to the income
elasticity of exports.25
III. Estimation and Results
These equations were estimated using quarterly data for
the. period 1974:l-1987:4Jor both Taiwan and Korea.26
Descriptions of the variables used in estimation and the
data sources are provided inAppendix A. All equations
wereestimatedby OLS. Thellnderlyingassumption isthat
once trade prices are set by the mark-up equations, the
quantities supplied will adjust{possibly with a lag, as
described in.Appendix B) to satisfy the resulting demand
forimports and exports. This assumption underlies a large
number ofempirical studies of international trade flows.27
The equations were estimated in first-difference form,
with the (one quarter) lagged levels of the explanatory
variablesand of the respective dependent variableson the
right-hand side of each equation. This "error-correction"
specification(which can be obtained asatransformationof
the. traditional stock adjustment model)has threedesirable
features:(1)it avoidsthepossibility of spurious correlation
among strongly trended variables; (2) long-run relation-
ships which may be lost by expressing the data in dif-
fer~ncesare captured by including the lagged levelsof the
variableson the right hand side; and (3) the specificationin
equations(l) to (4) is now expanded so as to distinguish
betweenshort-run and long-run elasticities. Furtherdetails
on the equations are provided in Appendix B.
The standard Durbin-Watson (d-statistic) test for serial
correlationcannot be used forthese regressions becauseof
thehiclusion of the lagged dependent variable onthe right
hand side. An alternative test for serial correlation was
performed by regressing the residuals of each regression
on.theright-hand side variables and the lagged residual. A
significantcoefficient on the lagged residual indicates the
presenceofserial correlation. Serial correlation could not
berejectedin one case at the 10percent level.
Trade• Prices
In~stin1atingequations (1) and (2), unit values-" were
usedlorepresentexport and import prices. Furthermore,
an index ofcommodity prices,which may be seen as.an
additional•.•'proxy for the effects of international price
movements on import and export prices, was included as
an explanatory variable in both price equations.
FederalReserve Bankof San Francisco
Table!reportsthe parameter estimates for the trade
price {unitvalue) equations.inTaiwan and Korea. The
expprt unit value equations, shown in the first and fourth
cQlutIlns of'Iablel, suggest that in the long run, exporters
inTaiwanand.Korea, respectively, pass through36% and
58% ofany changes in the exchange rate.• Thesepa$S-
through.coefficients are derived from the long-runelas-
ticitieson the exchange rate shown in the lowerhalf of
Tablel.
One explanation for these relatively small pass through
coefficients may be that exporters in both Taiwan and
Korea can price strategically to maintain market share
because theyhavehigh profitmargins. High profitmargins
may.result froma number of characteristics ofthe export
sectors of the two economies. First, a relatively high
proportion of the exports of Taiwan and Koreaare in light
industry sectors that are subject to quotas (textiles, for
example). This may produce quota rents for exporters.
Second, the governments of Taiwan and Korea have pro-
vided concessionary financing and other fiscal incentives
forexport promotion. Third, there are trading and market-
ing facilities in these countries that may havesome degree
of monopoly power, even when the individual scale of
production is small. Finally, producers in both economies
havedemonstrated the ability to improve production effi-
ciency, rather than raise prices, in response to changes in
exchange rates .. (On the other hand, the relatively small
scale of production and fairly competitive environment in
Taiwan, and the relatively small size and recent entry of
Taiwanese and Korean exporters in world markets may
weak:entheir ability to price strategically)
Another.possible reason why the pass through is rela-
tively low in both economies is that most of the exports of
these two countries are denominated in foreign currency,
which exposes exporters to currency risk. Currency risk
williaffectthepass through because exporters will only
alter their prices in response to those changes in the
exchange rate that they consider.to be permanent on the
b.~sisQfpast.experience. Moreover, risk-averse. exporters
willreducethe pass through to the extent that they are
uncertain about this estimate. Uncertainty is likely to be
higher ifexchangerates are volatile.
37Such exchange rate uncertainty is more likely to limit
the extent of the pass through in Taiwan, where exchange
rates have apparently been more volatile. Moreover, the
comparatively small scale of production may lead to
greater risk aversion among exporters, particularly since
small exporters may lack the sophistication or resources to
hedge in forward exchange markets.
Turning to import unit values, two versions of these
price equations were run: the first uses the log difference
and the log lagged level of the commodity price index as
38 Economic Review / Spring 1989the explanatory variable. These regressions are shown in
columns 2 and 5 of Table 1. In these regressions, the
coefficient on foreign prices has the wrong sign, and it is
not sigaificantin the equation for Korea. One possible
reason for this result is that the commodity price index
captures most of the variation in foreign costs.
In an attempt to deal with this difficulty, a second
regressionwas run using the ratioof commodity prices to
foreign prices as an explanatory variable. The results are
reported incolumns 3and 6of TableLAscan beseen, the
coefficient on trade-weighted foreign prices now has the
rightsign in.theequation forTaiwan(column 3),andthe fit
improves considerably. It still is not significant in the
equation for Korea (column 6), but the fit also seems to
improve. The import unitvalue equations, shown in the
third and sixth columns ofTable 1,suggest along-runpass
through ofexchange rate changes to import prices of 87
percent in Korea to a little over 100 percent in Taiwan.
'IradeFlows
Table 2 reports regression results for the trade volume
equationsJorTaiwan (columns 1 and 2) and Korea (col-
umns 3 and 4). Theelasticities have the expected sign and
FederakReserve·Bankof San Francisco 39the fit is satisfactory, considering that the dependent vari-
able is in first difference form.
The coefficients on the first differences ofrelative prices
are significant neither for Taiwan nor for Korea. On the
other hand, the coefficients on the lagged price levels
(which underlie the long-run elasticities) are highly sig-
nificant. In Taiwan, the long-runpriceelasticityofimports
is 80 percent larger than the long-run price elasticity of
exports; while in Korea, the corresponding elasticities are
about the same.29
The estimates of the long-run income elasticity of ex-
ports in Taiwan and Korea (about 2.8) are within the range
of estimates of the income elasticity of imports for the
U.S.,3° which is consistent with the role oftheU.S. as the
major export market for both economies. However, the
long-run income elasticities of imports in Taiwan and
Korea are much smaller (respectively, .82 and 1.08).
The price and income elasticities do not provide a
consistent picture of the possible role of trade policies in
explainingthe trade flows ofTaiwan and Korea. On the one
hand, the priceelasticitiesofimports are at leastas high as
the price elasticities for exports in both NIEs,31 which
suggests that the effectoftrade barriers on trade flows has
been no greater in the two NIEs than among their trading
partners. On the otherhand, the smallerincomeelasticities
of imports than of exports in both economies is consistent
with the hypothesis formulated in Section I that selective
trade barriers biased imports toward commodity groups
with low income elasticities and for which demand was
growing relatively more slowly.
The differences in income elasticities for export and
importvolumes imply that Taiwan has to grow at about 3.5
times the rate of its trading partners to maintain trade
balance in the absence of changes in relative prices. The
corresponding figure for relative growth in Korea is 2.6
times faster. However, because trade surpluses exist, Tai-
wan and Korea must grow at even faster rates in order to
restore trade balance.32 Over the period from 1974to 1987,
both Taiwan and Korea grew at approximately 2.5 times
the rate oftheir trading partners.
Proximate Sources of Real Trade Balance
The preceding regressions permit us to weigh the rela-
tive contributions ofthe explanatory variables to changes
in the trade balances of Taiwan and Korea over the sample
period. The results of these calculations are reported in
Table 3.
Since the relative magnitudes of these contributions
have changed over time, the sample period is divided into
40 Economic Review / Spring 1989three sub-periods: the period of u.s. dollardepreciation,
1975-80; the periodof dollarappreciation, 1981-84;and
themost recentepisode of dollardepreciation, 1985-87.
Thecontribution of each explanatory variable tothe aver-
age.four.quarter change in real exports and imports,
expressed in 1985 dollars, wascomputedfor eachof the
threesub-periods 'Using the following expressions:
X.«Xt_4 = (Px)(PEX/)(Xt_4) + (x)(Yt*')(Xt_4) + ex(5)
Mt ---M t_4 = (Pm)(PIM/)(Mt_4) +(m)(Y/)(Mt_4) + ern (6)
where"'" represents percent changes, Px and Pm are,
respectively, thelong-runpriceelasticitiesof exports and
imports, x and m are the long-run incomeelasticities of
exportsandimports,andthelevels ofexports andimports,
X andM, are expressedin constant 1985 dollars.
Thecontribution of price effectsto the total change in
exports is givenby thefirstmultiplicative right-hand-side
termin equation(5), the contribution of income effects is
givenby the secondmultiplicative right-hand-side term,
andthe unexplained portionis ex' Thecontribution of the
exchange rate to the change in exportswascalculated by
takingtheproduct of thechangein theexchange rate,the
longrunpass through(oneplusthelong-run elasticity for
theexchange rate in the exportprice equation), thelong-
runelasticityofrelativepricesPx andtheprevious period's
level of exports. The contributions to importchanges are
calculated-in a similarfashion.
Thenet.contributions ofrelativeprices,exchange rates,
andincome to changesin therealtradebalancewere then
obtainedbysubtractingthecontributions ofthesevariables
in the import equation from the corresponding contribu-
tions in the export equation. These net contributions are
reported in the firstfive lines of Table3.
Thefirst three columnsof Table3 reporttheresults for
Taiwan. Nominal exchange rates on the average have
tendedto appreciate, and therefore to limit the growth in
tradesurplusesin the 1980s,and particularlyafter1985.
However, theseexchangeratechangesdidnotconsistently
result in losses in competitiveness. Taiwan experienced
competitive gains through 1984apparently due to other
factors, such as lowinflation, thatoutweighed theeffects
ofcurrency appreciation. As a result, priceeffects tended
to increase trade surpluses until 1984. In the 1985-87
period,however,Taiwan hasexperienced significantlosses
incompetitivenessbeyond those caused by the apprecia-
tionoftheNT dollar. Relative pricechangeshave signifi-
cantly reduced the growth in trade surpluses. A major
reasonis a strong declinein relativeimportprices.33
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Income effects werethe major contributorto the trade
surplusesihTaiwaninthe1980s,butnotinthesecond half
ofthe1970s.Onereasonthecontributionofincomeeffects
increased. in the 1980s is that Taiwan's average growth
slowedto twicethat ofits trading partnersinthe 1981-84
peripd,compared to 2.6 times in the 1975-80 period.
(Taiwan's relativegrowthroseagaintoabout2.6 timesthat
of its tradingpartners in the 1985-87 period.)
Anotherreason is that after 1980, the level of exports
ex.ceededthfllevelofimports. Ascanbe seeninequations
(5) and (6), if.the previous.period's exports (Xt_4), are
higherthan theprevious period'simports(Mt_4), apercent-
agepointincreaseinforeign GNPgrowthappliedtothese





and the period from 1985 to 1987. This should have
reducedthepositivecontribution ofincomeeffects totrade




at an evenfasterrate to offsetthe impactof foreign GOP
growthon exportsif trade balanceis to be restored.
In the case of Korea (columns4 to 6), exchange rates
have consistently tended to depreciate, contributing to
p()sitivechanges in thetradebalance. However, theeffects
oLa weakening currency have been offset by relatively
high domestic inflation, and the positivecontribution of
relativeprices to trade surpluseshas been much smaller.
In. contrastto Taiwan, incomeeffectstendedto reduce
Korea's tradebalanceinthe1970s andafter1987, because
Korea's growth significantly outpacedthat of its trading
partners.On theotherhand, incomeeffectscontributedto
increasesin thetradebalanceinthe1981-84period,when
theratio of Korea's growth relative to that of its trading
partners dropped from 2.6 to 2.2. The contribution of
incomeeffects in Korea in this period was nevertheless
smallerthanitwasinTaiwan, becausethegapbetweenthe
incomeelasticitiesof exports and importsis smaller, and
because.tbe level of exports did not exceed the level of
importsin Korea.
Tosumup,the proximatecausesof tradesurpluses are
quite different in Taiwan and Korea. In Taiwan, income
effects are the dominantcause of rising trade surpluses,
whileexchange ratemovements have tendedtolimitgains
in competitiveness and the growth in trade surpluses.
Gainsin'competitiveness were nevertheless achieved be-
41cause of low domestic inflation. On the other hand, for
Korea, exchange rates have generally contributed to in-
creasing competitiveness, but the effects were to a large
extent offset by relatively high domestic inflation. In
contrast to Taiwan, the contribution of income effects to
trade surpluses has been small or negative.
Exchange Rates and Balanced Trade
The preceding regressions can be used to illustrate the
degree of currency appreciation that may be consistent
witheliminating trade surpluses and maintaining approxi-
mate trade balance in Taiwan and in Korea. Rough esti-
mates>' suggest that to eliminate Taiwan's trade surpluses
after 1985, a one-time trade-weighted appreciation of
approximately 30 percent is required. Assuming the aver-
age domestic andforeign growth rates (8.8 percentand 2.4
percent, respectively) observed over the entire sample
period (1974-1987), an additional annual appreciation
starting at about five percent is required to offset income
effects.V' Once trade balance is achieved, the exchange
rate would haveto appreciateby about two percentayearto
maintain real trade balance. These figures may be com-
pared to an actual trade-weighted appreciation of the NT
dollar of 15percent between late 1986 and early 1987.
To eliminateKorea's 1987 trade surplus in real terms, a
currency appreciation of about 17percent would be neces-
sary.An additionalannual appreciationof over two percent
isrequired, whichwillfall to 1/2 percenta year when trade
is.balanced. These estimates assume domestic and foreign
income growth at their average levels for the 1974 to 1987
period (nine percent and 3.6 percent, respectively).
In assessing the implications of the preceding calcula-
tions, the following points are worth bearing in mind.
First, the above exercises are only illustrative, as they
ignore a. numberof factors that affect the actual path of the
trade balance.P" Second, if capital flows were liberalized
and a free float were adopted in both economies, the
exehangecrate would not necessarily adjust to balance
merchandise trade in the mannerdescribed above. Theory
says thatinan open economy with capital mobility, ex-
change rates would adjust to assure balance of payments
equilibrium, so that trade surpluses or deficits are matched
by. corresponding capital flows. However, the resulting
exchange rate may be consistent with either merchandise
trade surpluses or deficits in the short-run. Finally, ex-
change rate appreciation is not the only wayof eliminating
trade surpluses, and in some cases, it may be appropriateto
use othermeasures, as well.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has identified the extent to which exchange
rate movements directlyexplain improvements in competi-
tiveness and rising trade surpluses in Taiwan and Korea in
the 1980s. The hypothesis that exchange rate movements
improved competitiveness and thus contributed directly to
trade imbalances in the 1980s holds for Korea, but not for
Taiwan.
In the case of Taiwan, nominal exchange rates on the
average appreciated in the 1980s, tending to limit competi-
tive gains as well as rising trade surpluses, particularly
after 1985. While Taiwan experienced gains in competi-
tiveness due to otherfactors, such as relatively low domes-
tic inflation, such gains in competitiveness are not the
majorreason for the growth in Taiwan's trade surpluses in
the 1980s. A more important reason for rising trade
surpluses is that Taiwan has not grown fast enough to
guarantee trade balance, given an income elasticity of
exportsthat is 3.5times largerthan the incomeelasticity of
imports.
In the case ofKorea, nominal exchange rate movements
appear to have offset losses in competitiveness associated
with Korea's relatively high inflation. Through 1984, then,
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exchange rate movements contributed to a reduction in
Korea's trade deficits, and after 1984, to an increase in the
trade surplus. In contrast to Taiwan, the income effects
have tended to reduce the trade balance, because the gap
between export and import income elasticities is much
smaller.
In recent years, both Taiwan and Korea have allowed
their currencies to appreciate in an effort to correct their
external imbalances and defuse protectionist responses
among theirtradingpartners. The results of this papermay
beusedto examinethe options available to both economies
in pursuing this effort.
The simulations presented in this paper indicate that,
given plausible assumptions regarding relative income
growth,a large one-time appreciation and subsequent
permanent: annual appreciation of the NT dollar and the
Korean wonwouldbe requiredto restoreand then maintain
trade balance(in orderto offset the gap betweenexportand
importincome elasticities) in both economies. Since per-
manent currency appreciation may adversely affect eco-
nomic activity, itmay be desirable to supplementexchange
rate appreciation with other measures to reduce external
Economic Review / Spring 1989imbalances. This is particularly true for Taiwan, where the
required currency appreciation is higher largely because
factors other than changes in exchange rates have been
more important contributors to the trade surpluses.
fIowever,finding other measures to reduce external
imbalances will be more difficult for Taiwan than for
Korea. Theresultsofthis paperindicatethat Koreacan also
reduce trade surpluses by maintaining a sufficiently high
rate of domesticgrowth in comparison to that of its trading
partners; however, this is not a feasible long-run strategy
for Taiwan, because the gap between the income elas-
ticities of exports and imports is so large.
Alternatively, both economies (andparticularlyTaiwan)
can seek to identify measures that will reduce the gap
b~tweentbe income elasticities of exports and imports.
Unfortunately, there is little guidance in the literature on
h?\Vthis mightbe accomplished. Itis possible that further
iIllPort liberalization may reduce the elasticities gap by
significantly increasing imports, but this issue needs to be
researchedfurther. In the case ofTaiwan, an analysis of the
reasons why imports have lagged in relation to exports in
the 1980s, and the possible role of stagnant domestic
investment spending, also may provide insights.
APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions andData Sources
Variable Definitions












= domestic price level
= trade-weighted foreign CPI
= trade-weighted foreign GDP.
= real domestic GDP
= import volume
= (PX)(XR)/FCPI = relative price ofexports
= PM/CPI = relative price of imports
= import unit values, in domestic currency
= export unit values, in domestic currency
= export volume
= trade-weighted index of units of foreign
currency to domestic currency (an increase
is an appreciation), 1980 trade weights.
DataSources
Exchange rate, CPI, nominal and real exports and
imports, unit values for exports and imports, annual real
GDP, investment, and quarterly industrial production (the
latter are used as instruments to generate quarterly GDP
series): Financial Statistics, Taiwan District, Republic of
China (compiled in accordance with IFS format) for Tai-
wan and IMFInternational Financial Statistics for Korea.
The exchange rate, CPI, and real GDP series for the
trading partners of Taiwan and South Korea are obtained
from IMF, International Financial Statistics, with the
exception of Hong Kong, where the source is Hong Kong's
Monthly Digest ofStatistics.
Direction of trade data, on the basis of which trade
weights are constructed and bilateral trade balances are
discussed, are from the OECD, the IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics, or Monthly Statistics ofthe Republic of
China.
Commodity prices are represented by the Journal of
Commerce commodity price index.
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TheError..CorrectionModel
To illustratethederivationoftheequationsin the.form
they were estimated, considerthe exportvolUIne equation
(equation 1in the text), rewrittentoassume that prices and
income affect export demand with one lag:
Xf = ..3.0 + alPEXt +a2 PEXt_1
+ a:3FGDPt+ a4FGDPt_1 (Ad)
A disequilibrium ••framework is.also assumed, so that
export volumes adjust to the difference between desired
(Xf) and actual export volume in the previous period:
.lXt = Z (Xf - Xt_l) (A.2)
where .1 represents a first difference. Substituting (A.2)
into (Ad) yields an equation that is frequently estimated:
X, =eo + elPEXt + e2 PEXt_1
+ e3 FGDPt + e4 FGDPt_1 + e5 Xt_l. (A.3)
This is the geometric lag specification, where ei = z.a.,
i = 1,2,3,4 andes = 1 z. Thus, l-e5is the coefficient
ofadjustment. The actual demand elasticities are obtained
by dividing the coefficients in equation (A.3) by (1~e5).
ApotentiaLdifficultywith (A.3) isthatthevariablesin
levels may contain strong trend components, producing
spurious correlation between the variables. This is often
addressed by running the regression in equation (A.3)
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usingfirstdifferencesrathert~an thelevels ofthe.vari-
ables.However, this creates other problems, as such a
regression umy failto capturethe long-run relationships
aIIl0n~thevari(lbles'lI~ndry(l979),therefore, suggestsan
alternative "error-correction"specification,that.in<;ludes
first differences and t~elagged levels.of the.variables:
.l.~ =io+fr.lPEXt+f,zi.lFGDPt
+ f3 PEXt_L +< f4 FODPt"1 + i 5Xt- 1
In equation(A.3') short run relationships.are captured by
the coefficientsonthechanges in the variables, whilelong-
runrelationships are•captured.by.the coefficients.on• the
lagged levels of the variables on the right hand side. The
r~aqerCaI1Ve{ifyt~atequation (A.3') is a simple linear
transformationofequatioIl(A.3)wheref5 = e5 1<0.The
long-run price elasticity of exports is then f3/ ( - f5) =
(el+ e2)/ ( - f5)< 0 and the long-run income elasticity of
exportsisf4/ ( - f5)= (e3+e4)/ ( - f5» O.
The "error-correction" specification forimport volumes
and export and import prices .is··derivedin an analogous
manner.Theadjustment mechanism described byequation
(A.2) can be said to applytotrade prices becausecontracts
may prevent producers from immediately adjusting their
prices to desired levels.
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1. The G-6 industrial countries that met to discuss eco-
nomic policies at the time of the Louvre meeting were the
U.S.,Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdo~,.and
Canacla.ltaly joined the later meetings of the (G-7) Indus-
trial countries. The Asian NIEs are Taiwan, (South) Korea,
Singapore, and Hong Kong. The text refers to Taiwan,
rather than Taiwan, Province of China, for the sake of
brevity.
2. Jncontrast,in1987, Hong Kong had a currentaccount
surplus, but balance in its merchandise.tracle;Singapore
has a small current account surplus and a very large
deficit in merchandise trade. Both economies have
among the mostliberal trading regirnesin the world.
3. U.S.Departmentofthe Treasury (1988),p. 37. Seealso
PP.16~19. The report was submitted incompliance with
theOrnnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988(P.L.
100-418).
4. Rapid import growth is one characteristic of econo-
mies adopting an export-led growth strategy, rather than
import-substitution policies. See Note 11.
5. The levelling off in Taiwan's imp~)fts coincided wit~ a
sharp decline in investment spendinq a!ter 1980, which
widened the gap between saving and Investment. D?-
mestic investment in Taiwan was 20 percent of GNP In
1987, dQwn from 35 percent in 1980. Over the same
period gross national saving rosefrom 33 percent of GNP
to 41 percent of GNP. The counterpart t<? Taiwan's t:ade
surpluses, the gap between n~tional saving and national
investment thus rose dramatically between 1980 and
1987.Onthe other hand, the ratio of investment spending
to GNP in South Korea fell from 33 percent of GNPin1980
(which possibly was unsustainable) to 29 percent of ~NP
in 1987.The ratio of national saving to GNP has remained
somewhat above 30 percent.
6. Incontrast, the share of manufactured exports ofhighly
indebted developing countries rose from 11 percent to 32
percent over the same period. The rapid growth of man-
ufactured exports in the two NIEs has occurred not-
withstanding rising protectionist barriers in industrial
countries, such asthe imposition of more stringent quotas
ontextiles, and U.S.non-tariff barriers on capital-intensive
manufactures such as steel, in which South Korea, in
particular, is becoming increasingly competitive.
7-. The share of capital-intensive manufactures in South
Korea's exports in1982was 26 percent, .abo~t10 percen~­
age points larger than the correspondinq figure f<?r T~I­
wan. This share has probably Increased more rapidly In
South Korea than in Taiwan in recent years as a result of
the entry of South Korea into the automob.ile markets of
North America and Europe and the growth In demand for
South Korean steel.
8.· For example, Kuo and Fei(1985) report that inthe case
of Taiwan,the proportionof total imports that is used in t~e
export sectorgrew from 23percentin1961 to63 percent In
1976.
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9. The falling share of agricultural ~omn:odities in th.e
imports of Taiwan and South Korea, In which the.U.S. IS
particularly competitive, also.limited the growth of Imports
from the U.S.
10. See De Rosa (1986),OECD (1988), and Wu (198.8) for
a discussion of recent trade policies and trade restric-
tions.
11. D(j8 to trade liberalization which began in the late
1950sand early 1960s, the trade regimes of b?th Taiwan
and South Korea are in OlanyreSp(ilctsmore IIp(ilral than
those of otherdeveloping countries. Thereason isthat the
export-led growth strategies of Taiwan a~d South Kor~a
require a reduction in the levels of protectionfor.dcmestic
manufacturing, in order to motivate domestic producers
to produce for world markets rather than for the smaller
domestic market. Protection rates have been reduced by
bringing domestic prices more closely in line ~ith world
prices, first by lowering import barriers over time: and
second by providing subsidies and other benefits to
encourage production for exports (in order to reduce
further the incentivesfor production in protected domestic
markets created by the remaining barriers totrade). Bene-
fits to exporters included preferential access to foreign
exchange, concessionary financing and tax brea~s, and
exemptions from customs duties for raw maten?1 and
Capital goods imports.for the export ~ector. The Impor-
tance of these incentives fell over time astrade was
liberalized.
The impact of these measures is reflected in low~r
effective rates of protection in Taiwan and South Korea In
comparisonto other developing economies. Forexample,
by1969,the nominal protection rate inTaiwanhad fallen to
nine percent, and to 13percent in South Korea, c<?mpared
to 36 percent for Argentina. The effective protection rates
were, respectively, five, 10, and 47 percent.
12. OECD (1988). Taiwan sources suggest that a much
greaterdegree of trade liberalization was already in pla?e
by 1975. Drawing on official Taiwan sources a~d ~arller
research by S.C. Tsiang and others, Wu (1988)m~lcates
that the share of permissible importables has remained at
around 97 percent of total importables since 1975,While
the share of controlled or prohibited imports has been
around three percent. The large discrepancy between
OECD and Taiwan source estimates apparently results
from different definitions. Forexample, the listof permissi-
ble importables cited by Wu includes goods that are not
automatically approved for import.
13. Trade barriers in both economies target consumer
and agricultural goods, particularly those with hig~ v~lue
added (fresh and canned fruits, for example). Restrictions
are also imposed on imports in certai~ sectors :rvhere the
developmentof domestic manufactunng capacity appa.r-
entlyis desired. For example, Korea protects certain
sectors where its manufacturers are recent or poten-
tial entrants in world markets, such as computers and
45peripherals, telecommunications equipment, and motor
vehicles.
14. For discussions and empirical estimates of the in-
come elasticities of various commodity groups see, Theil
(1975) and Johnson, et at (1984).
15. A rise in imports of consumer goods might have
resulted from a rise in the share of consumption in total
spending.
16. This was part of an IMF-style adjustment program
which included efforts to dampen domestic demand
growth. An interesting account of this unusually success-
fuladjustment episode is provided by Aghevli (1985).
17. See presentation of Director-General of the Inter-
national Policy Coordination Office of Korea's Economic
Planning Board. Koo (1987), p. 11.
18. Debt prepayments and the appreciation of the won
againstthe U.S.dollarcontributed to adecline inthe debt-
to-GNP ratio(both expressed inU.S.dollars) from approx-
imately 58 percent in 1985 to 36 percent in 1987.
19. Conversely, a country whose nominal currency is
appreciating may experience competitive gains if domes-
tic inflation is sufficiently low.As discussed later,Taiwanis
a rare example of this latter case.
20. Trade-weighted exchange rate indices were con-
structed by taking the geometric average of the nominal
exchange rates of each economy with the 10 most im-
portant trading partners (excluding non-NIE developing
countries) in the case of Taiwan and the nine most impor-
tant trading partners in the case of South Korea. The
weights (ineach case based on1980bilateral exports and
imports) were: Taiwan; US45.2, UK3.0, FRG7.1,Italy2.2,
France 1.5, Canada 2.8, Japan 25.0, Australia 4.2, Hong
Kong 7.1, and Korea 1.9. South Korea; US 40.1, UK 3.7,
FRG 6.~, Italy 1.5, France 2.0, Canada 3.0, Japan 37.5,
Australia 3.8, and Netherlands 1.8. The most important
industrial country or East Asian NIEtrading partners were
included in the basket.
21. Very similar models are described in Hooper (1976)
and Helkie and Hooper (1987). See also Goldstein and
Khan (1985).
22. Actually, the price setting specification that follows
may be interpreted either interms of a mark-up or interms
of the lawof one price. As noted by Dornbusch (1987),the
former is appropriate in the case of trade in distinct
manufactured goods, the latter is appropriate in the case
of more homogeneous commodities. Thetrade flows ana-
lyzed in this paper involve total trade of both commodities
and manufactured goods. Since these are not homoge-
neous, the mark-up interpretation appears to be more
appropriate.
23. A long-run pass-through coefficient greater than one
is also possible, although the intuition is less transparent.
Feenstra (1988) notes that if the elasticity of demand is
constant or decreasing in price, and if marginal costs
are declining, profit maximizing price-setters may pass
through morethan 100percentofexchange ratechanges.
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24. SeeGoldstein and Khan (1985)for a discussion of the
results found in the literature.
25. A shift in relative prices caused by tariffs can affect
the. income elasticity of imports, and not just income
s.hares, ifpreferences are not homothetic. The implica-
tions of tariffs for income elasticities are not addressed in
the•literature, possibly because homothetic preferences
are usually assumed in empirical studies of demand (see
Johnson et aI[1984]).
26. Quarterly data were not available for GDP for the
ent~resampleperiod.lnthe case of Taiwan, a quarterly
SeneSwas created from annual data using quarterly in-
dustrial production as an instrument. In the case of South
Korea, a quarterly series was created for 1986 and 1987,
asthelFSdoes not report quarterly data over the period.
The technique is described in Chow and Lin (1971).
2J,SeeGolqstein and Khan (1985)for a fuller discussion
ofestimation methods in empirical studies of international
trade.
28. A unit value index is an implicit price index, obtained
by dividing total nominal expenditures on a product by the
quantity of the product.
29. The long-run price elasticity of non-oil exports of the
U.S.(-0.83) according to Helkie and Hooper (1987), is
close to the price elasticity of imports of South Korea
(-.74), but well below the corresponding price elasticity
for Taiwan (-1.44).
Ont~eother hand, the long-run price elasticity of exports
ofTaiwanand SouthKorea (- .79 and -.72, respectively)
appear to be smaller than the price elasticity of U.S.
ilTlports reported by Helkie and Hooper (-1.15). One
possible explanation is that a relatively large share of the
exports of Taiwan and South Korea still is concentrated in
lightindustry exports which are less substitutable for a
wide range of U.S. manufactured goods or which may be
supject to quotas (e.g. textiles).
30. Helkie and Hooper (1987) estimate an income elas-
ticity of two, Throop (1988) gives an estimate of three.
Helkie and Hooper obtain a lower estimate of the income
elasticity of U.S. imports because they introduce addi-
tional.explanatory variables to reflect developments in
the productive capacity and market penetration of U.S.
trading partners. This approach was not followed in the
present paper because an appropriate proxy for such
developments is very hard to define.
31. This is particularly surprising, since the share of (rela-
tiyely price inelastic) primary commodities in imports is
hlgherthantheshare of primary commodities inexports in
both economies.
32. See discussion of equations (5) and (6) below in text.
33. The fall in relative import prices is not fully explained
by the appreciation of exchange rates. This suggests that
other factors, such as the decline in oil prices, may have
plCl.yed a role as well.
34. Iftrade is balanced, the annual percent change inthe
exchange rate required to offset income effects so as to
Economic Review / Spring 1989maintaintrade balance is:
XR' = - (xy'* - my') / [(1 +hi) Px - Pmh2]
whereXR'is the percent change inthe exchangerate, y'*
and y' arethe foreign and domestic growth rates,xis the
long-runc income elasticity of exports, m is the long-run
income elasticity of imports, (1 +hi) is the long-runpass
through from exchange rates to export prices, p; is the
long-runprice elasticityofexports,h2isthe longcn.m pass
throughfrom exchange ratesto import prices, andPm is
the long-runprice elasticityofimports.
Iftrade isnot balanced, the annualpercentchange inthe
exchange rate required to eliminatethe trade imbalance
(ignoring income effects) is:
XR' = - T / [(1 +h1) (PxXo - h2PmMo)]
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco
WhereTisthetrade surplusordeficit, Xoistheinitiallevel
of exportsand Moistheinitiallevelof imports.Inaddition,
an annualappreciation is required to offsetthe impact of
income effects. In the first year, the appreciation is:
XR' = - (xy'* Xo - my'Mo) / [(1 +h1)(pxXo - h2Pm Mo)].
35. Theone-time appreciation may be distributed over
several periods, but then the subsequent annual appre-
ciation rateswill be larger.
36. Forexample,thecalculations assumethatbothecon-
omieswiUgrowat their 1974-87 average rate in com-
parison.>t? their trading partners, whereas more rapid
appreciation might slow economic growth below this av-
erage (and leadto a largertrade surplusthrough income
effec.ts). The calculations alsoexclude the effect of other
factors- such as low domestic inflation in Taiwan, on
competitiveness.
47REFERENCES
Aghevli, Bijan B. "A Case of Successful Adjustment:
Korea'sExperienceDuring1980-84."Occasional Pa-
pers No. 39. Washington: International Monetary
Fund,1985.
Balassa,Belaand Associates.Development Strategies in
Semi-Industrial Economies. Washington: The World
Bank,1982.
Balassa, BelaA. and John Williamson. Adjustingto Suc-
cess: Balanceof Payments Policies in theEastAsian
NICs. Washington: Institutefor International Econom-
ics, 1987.
Branson, William. "Trade and Structural Independence
Between the U.S. and NICs" in Colin I. Bradford
andWilliam H. Branson, eds., Trade and Structural
Change in Pacific Asia. NBER Conference Report
Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1987.
Chow, GregoryC. and An-IohLin. "Best LinearUnbiased
Interpolation, Distribution, and Extrapolation of Time
Seriesby RelatedSeries," The Review of Economics
andStatistics, 1971.
DeRosa, Dean A. "Trade and Protection in the Asian
Developing Region," Asian Development Review.
Asian DevelopmentBank,1986, Vol4, NO.1.
Dornbusch, R. "Exchange Rates'and Prices," American
Economic Review, 77.
Feenstra, Robert C. "Symmetric Pass-Through of Tariffs
and Exchange Rates under Imperfect Competition:
An Empirical Test." Working PaperNo. 2453. NBER,
December 1987.
Giovannini, A. ExchangeRates andTradedGoodsPrices,
Journal of International Economics, 1988.
Goldstein,Morrisand MohsinS.Khan. "Income and Price
Effectsin ForeignTrade," in Ronald Jones and Peter
Kenen, eds., Handbookof International Economics,
Volume II. New York: NorthHolland,1985.
Harvey, A.C. The Econometric Analysis of Time Series.
New York: John Wiley& Sons, 1981.
Helkie, William and Peter Hooper. "The U.S. External
Deficit in the 1980s: An Empirical Analysis." Inter-
national Finance Discussion Papers No. 304. Wash-
ington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, February1987.
Hendry, David F. "Predictive Failure and Econometric
Modellingin Macroeconomics:TheTransactions De-
mand for Money," in P. Omerod, ed., Modelling the
Economy. London: Heinemann Educational Books,
1979.
Hooper, Peter. "Forecasting U.S. Export and Import
Prices and Volumesin a Changing World Economy."
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 99.
Washington: Board of Governorsof the Federal Re-
serveSystem, December 1976.
Johnson, Stanley, Zuhair Hassan and Richard Green.
Demand Systems Estimation: Methods and Applica-
tions. Ames, Iowa:IowaStateUniversityPress, 1984.
48
Koo,Bohn-Young. "Korea'sStrategyforBalancedGrowth
and Improved Trade Relations." Processed. Pre-
sented to The Asia Society, New York, May 11, 1987.
Liang,Kuo-shuand Ching-ing Hou Liang. "Taiwan's New
International. Role in Light of Changes in Compara-
tive Advantage, Trade Patternsand Balance of Pay-
ments." Processed. Presented at the Conference
on Economic Development Experiences of Taiwan,
sponsored.by the Instituteof Economics, Academia
Sinica,ResourceSystemsInstitute,East-West Center,
Chung-HuaInstitutionforEconomicResearch. Taipei,
Taiwan, June 8-10, 1988.
Lin, Ching-yuan. "Policy Reforms, International Compet-
itiveness and Export Performance: Chile and Ar-
gentina versus The Republic of Korea and Taiwan,
Provinceof China." Working PaperWP/87/49. Wash-
ington: IMFJuly 23,1987.
Moreno, Ramon. "The NICs,the Dollar and the U.S. Defi-
cit," FRBSF Weekly Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of
SanFrancisco,August 15,1986.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment.The Newly-Industrializing Countries, Challenge
and Opportunity for DECO Industries. Paris, 1988.
Rana, P.B. "Changes in the Export Patterns of Asian
andPacificDevelopingCountries:AnEmpiricalOver-
view." Asian Development Bank Economic StaffPa-
per No. 34. Manila: The Asian Development Bank,
1987.
Shinohara, Miyohei. "Real Exchange Rates and Patterns
of Industrialization in East and SoutheastAsia." The
Developing Economies. Vol XXI, NO.4. Tokyo: In-
stitute of Developing Economies, December 1983.
Theil,Henri. Theory and Measurement of Consumer De-
mand. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1975.
Throop, Adrian, "A Macroeconometric Model of the U.S.
Economy." Working Paper 88-06. Federal Reserve
Bankof SanFrancisco,September 1988.
U.S. Office of the United States Trade Representative.
1987 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers. Washington, 1988.
U.S. Congress. Joint EconomicCommittee.Restoring In-
ternational Balance: The Taiwan Economy and Inter-
national Trade. 1987.
World Bank. World Development Report1987. New York:
Oxford UniversityPress, 1987.
WorldBank. World Development Report1988. New York:
Oxford UniversityPress, 1988.
Wu, Chung-lih. "Some Measuresto Promote a MoreBal-
anced BilateralTradeRelationshipBetween the ROC
and the U.S.A.-Economic and Political Implica-
tions," Economic Review, International Commercial
Bank of China, Taiwan, China, January-February
1988.
Economic Review / Spring 1989